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ABSTRACT
The Web is a tangled mass of interconnected services, where web-
sites import a range of external resources from various third-party
domains. However, the latter can further load resources hosted on
other domains. For each website, this creates a dependency chain
underpinned by a form of implicit trust between the first-party and
transitively connected third-parties. The chain can only be loosely
controlled as first-party websites often have little, if any, visibility
of where these resources are loaded from. This paper performs a
large-scale study of dependency chains in the Web, to find that
around 50% of first-party websites render content that they did
not directly load. Although the majority (84.91%) of websites have
short dependency chains (below 3 levels), we find websites with
dependency chains exceeding 30. Using VirusTotal, we show that
1.2% of these third-parties are classified as suspicious — although
seemingly small, this limited set of suspicious third-parties have
remarkable reach into the wider ecosystem. By running sandboxed
experiments, we observe a range of activities with the majority of
suspicious JavaScript downloading malware; worryingly, we find
this propensity is greater among implicitly trusted JavaScripts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the modern web ecosystem, websites often load resources from
a range of third-party domains such as ad providers, tracking ser-
vices, content distribution networks (CDNs) and analytics services.
This is a well known design decision that establishes an explicit
trust between websites and the domains providing such services.
However, often overlooked is the fact that these third-parties can
further load resources from other domains, creating a dependency
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chain. This results in a form of implicit trust between first-party
websites and any domains loaded further down the chain.
Consider the bbc.com webpage, which loads JavaScript from
the widgets.com domain, which, upon execution loads additional
content from another third-party, say ads.com. Here, bbc.com as
the first-party website, explicitly trusts widgets.com, but implicitly
trusts ads.com. This can be represented as a simple dependency
chain in which widgets.com is at level 1 and ads.com is at level 2
(see Figure 1). Past work tends to ignore this, instead, collapsing
these levels into a single set of third-parties [9, 33]. Here, we argue
that this overlooks a vital aspect of website design. For example,
it raises a notable security challenge, as first-party websites lack
visibility on the resources loaded further down their domain’s de-
pendency chain. The dynamic nature of the content being loaded
and the wide adoption of in-path traffic alterations [6, 36] further
complicates the issue. This potential threat should not be under-
estimated as errant active content (e.g., JavaScript) opens the way
to a range of further exploits, e.g., Layer-7 DDoS attacks [34] or
massive ransomware campaigns [24].
This paper studies dependency chains in the web ecosystem.
Although there has been extensive work looking at the presence of
third-parties in general [9, 31, 33], little work has focused on how
content is indirectly loaded by first-party websites via dependency
chains.We start by inspecting how extensive dependency chains are
across the Alexa’s top-200K (Section 2) [7]. We confirm their promi-
nence, finding that around 50% of websites do allow third-parties to
form dependency chains (i.e., they implicitly trust third-parties they
do not directly load). The most commonly implicitly trusted third-
parties are well known operators, e.g., google-analytics.com and
doubleclick.net: these are implicitly imported by 68.3% (134,510)
and 46.4% (91,380) websites respectively. However, we also observe
a wide range of more obtuse third-parties such as pippio.com and
51.la imported by 0.52% (1,146) and 0.51% (1,009) of websites. Al-
though the majority (84.91%) of websites have short chains (with
levels of dependencies below 3), we find first-party websites with de-
pendency chains exceeding 30 in length. This not only complicates
page rendering, but also creates notable attack surface.
With the above in mind, we then proceed to inspect if suspicious
or even potentiallymalicious third-parties are loaded via these long
dependency chains (Section 4). We do not limit this to just tradi-
tional malware, but also include third-parties that are known to
mishandle user data and risk privacy leaks. Using the VirusTotal
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service [22] API, we classify third-party domains into innocuous vs.
suspicious. When using a reasonable classification threshold, we
find that 1.2% of third-parties are classified as suspicious. Although
seemingly small, we find that this limited set of suspicious third-
parties have remarkable reach. 73% of websites under-study load
resources from suspicious third-parties, and 24.8% of first-party
webpages contain at least 3 third-parties classified as suspicious
in their dependency chain. This, of course, is impacted by many
considerations whichwe explore —most notably, the power-law dis-
tribution of third-party popularity, which sees a few major players
on a large fraction of websites.
The prevalence of JavaScript resources being classified as sus-
picious leads us to further explore their activities. We therefore
proceed to sandbox all suspicious JavaScript programs to monitor
their activities (Section 5). We build a sandbox and perform tests
executing suspicious JavaScript. We observe that the further down
the dependency chain, the more active the suspicious JavaScript
are with a high number of HTTP requests generated by suspicious
JavaScript programs at level ≥2. This is worrying as resources
loaded further down the dependency chain are the most opaque
to the website operator. We find evidence of involvement of first-
party websites in malicious SEO (search) poisoning activities when
(implicitly) loading some suspicious JavaScript content. Perhaps
more importantly, we find that the most typical purpose of the
suspicious JavaScript code is downloading dropfiles: again, the
propensity to download files actually increases further along the
chain with the most active JavaScript at level 4 downloading 129
files. We share our datasets, experimental testbed code and scripts
used in this paper with the wider research community for fur-
ther analysis of the consequences of the Web’s implicit trust on
https://wot19submission.github.io. We conclude the paper
by summarising reality of a very fragile web ecosystem, revealing
that suspicious parties within the dependency chains are relatively
commonplace (§7).
2 DATASET AND DATA ENRICHMENT
2.1 Alexa dependency dataset
We start by presenting our data collection methodology, and how
we have validated its correctness.
2.1.1 Data Collection. We obtain the resource dependencies of
the Alexa top-200K websites’ main pages1 using the method de-
scribed in [28]. This Chromium-based Headless [12] crawler ren-
ders a given website and tracks resource dependencies by recording
network requests sent to third-party domains. The requests are
then used to reconstruct the dependency chains between each
first-party website and its third-party URLs. Note that each first-
party can trigger the creation of multiple dependency chains (to
form a tree structure). Figure 1 presents an example of a depen-
dency chain with 3 levels; level 1 is explicitly trusted by the first-
party website, whilst level 2 and 3 are implicitly (or indirectly)
trusted. For simplicity, we refer to any domain that differs from
the first-party to be a third-party. More formally, to construct the
dependency tree, we identify third-party requests by comparing the
1We select the top 200K as this gives us broad coverage of globally popular websites,
whilst also remaining tractable for our subsequent data enrichment activities.
bbc.com
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Image/GIF
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Figure 1: Example dependency chain, including malicious
third-party (in red).
second level domain of the page (e.g., bbc.com) to the domains of
the requests (e.g., cdn.com and ads.com via widgets.com). Those
with different second level domains are considered third-party.
We ignore the sub-domains so that a request to a domain such
as player.bbc.com is not considered as third-party. Due to the
lack of purely automated mechanism to disambiguate between site-
specific sub-domains (e.g., player.bbc.com) or country-specific
sub-domains (e.g., bbc.co.uk), we leverage Mozilla Public Suffix
list [41] and tldextract [29] for this task. From the Alexa Top-
200k websites, we collect 11,287,230 URLs which consist of 6,806,494
unique external resources that correspond to 68,828 and 196,940,
respectively, unique second level domains of third- and first-parties.
We acknowledge that the constructing the dependencies between
objects in webpages is non-trivial task. In cases like where third-
party JavaScript gets loaded into a first-party context, and then
makes an AJAX request, the HTTP(S) request appears to be from
the first-party (i.e. the referrer will be the first-party). To overcome
such cases and to preserve the information on relations between
the nested resource dependencies, we allow the crawler to include
the URL of the third-party from which the JavaScript was loaded
by first-party.
2.1.2 Data Validation. As our main dataset relies on a single snap-
shot, we want to evaluate the stability of the resources loaded by
websites to ensure that a single snapshot does not miss significant
complexity within the ecosystem. Thus, we repeat the methodol-
ogy from Section 2.1.1 on a daily basis. Unfortunately, performing
daily crawls for the Alexa top-200k websites was not possible. We
therefore selected 1,500 domains as a seed for the crawler. This
list consisted of the Alexa top-1K alongside 250 domains randomly
selected from the Alexa rank ranging from 1K to 50K, and a final
250 domains randomly chosen from websites within the Alexa rank
50K–200K. This offers a broad sampling of the Alexa sites covered.
In total, on daily a basis from September 15–October 2 2018, we
have collected on average 225,035 unique URLs per daily snapshot
which covers 5,423 unique second level domains from the 1,500
first-parties.
Figure 2 presents the day-to-day stability of the domains we
see within each website.2 We observe that 95.07% of second level
2We define the (normalized) stability as the count of domains present in the dependency
trees crawled on day n and also present on day n + 1. More specifically, letC denoting
the crawled data then, stability = Cn∩Cn+1Cn∪Cn+1 .
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Figure 2: Stability of day-by-day dependency trees analyzed per do-
main
domains remain consistent across consecutive days, and only an
average 4.93% of domains were absent in any two consecutive
snapshots. On average, only 35 (0.66%) and 232 (4.27%) domains
are absent at explicit and implicit dependency levels, respectively.
Hence, we take this as strong indicator that utilizing a single snap-
shot is sufficient for gaining vantage into the use of third-parties.
We leave inspection of temporal dynamics to our future work.
2.2 Data Enrichment
Malicious domains may circumvent a specific antivirus (AV) tool
and, as suggested by previous studies [1, 4], some AV tools may
not always report reliable results. Therefore, it is imperative to
rely upon multiple AV scanners and datasets to effectively classify
domains as innocuous vs. suspicious. We leverage the capabilities
offered by VirusTotal’s public API to automatize our classification
process. VirusTotal is an online solution which aggregates the scan-
ning capabilities provided by more than 68 AV tools, scanning
engines and datasets. It has been commonly used in the academic
literature to detect malicious apps, executables, software and do-
mains [16, 20, 21, 25, 26].
We use the VirusTotal report APIs to obtain the VTscore for each
third-party URL. Concretely, this score is the number of AV tools
that flagged the website as malicious (max. 68). The reports also
contain meta-information such as the first scan date, scan history,
domain name resolution (DNS) history, website or domain cate-
gory, reverse DNS, and whois information. We further supplement
each domain with their WebSense [46] category provided by the
VirusTotal’s record API. During the augmentation, we eliminate
repeating, unresponsive or invalid URLs in each dependency chain.
Thus, we collect the above metadata for each second level domain
in our dataset. This results in a final sample of 196,940 first-party
websites, and 68,828 third-party domains.
3 EXPLORING THE CHAINS
We begin by exploring the presence and usage of implicit trust
chains. We first confirm if websites do, indeed, rely on implicit trust
and then explore how these chains are used.
3.1 Do websites rely on implicit trust?
Overall, the Top-200k dataset collectively makes 11,287,230 calls to
6,806,494 unique external resources, with a median of 27 external
resources per first-partywebsite. To dissect this, Table 1 presents the
percentage of webpages in each Alexa range that load explicitly and
Alexa Rank
1-200K 1-10K 190-200K 10-50K 50-100K 100-200K
F.-Parties that trust:
All Resources:
Explicit (Lvl. 1) 95% 95% 95% 94% 95% 95%
Implicit (Lvl. ≥ 2) 49.7% 55.1% 47.9% 51.8% 50.23% 48%
JavaScript:
Explicit 91% 92% 91% 91% 91% 90%
Implicit 49.5% 55% 47.8% 51.69% 50% 47.8%
Table 1: Overview of the Dataset for different ranges of Alexa’s
ranking. The rows indicate the proportion of Alexa’s Top-X web-
sites that explicitly and implicitly trust at least one third-party (i) re-
source (of any type); and (ii) JavaScript.
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Figure 3: (a) CDF of dependency chain lengths (broken down
into categories of first-party websites); and (b) distribution
of third-party websites across various categories and levels.
implicitly trusted third-parties. Confirming several prior studies [9,
31], it shows that 95% of websites import external resources, with
91% importing externally hosted JavaScript. This trend is already
well known; more important is that observation that around 50% of
the websites do rely on implicit trust chains, i.e., they allow third-
parties to load further third-parties on their behalf. The propensity
to form dependency chains is marginally higher in more popular
websites; for example, 55% in the Alexa top 10K have dependency
chains compared to 48% in the bottom 10K (i.e., rank 190-200K). In
other words, more popular websites tend to rely more on implicitly
trusted third-parties.
These implicitly trusted third-parties appear at various positions
in the dependency chain. Intuitively, long chains are undesirable
as they typically have a deleterious impact on page load times [45]
and increase attacks surface. Figure 3a presents the CDF of chain
length for all first-party websites. For context, websites are sepa-
rated into their sub-categories.3 It shows that 80% of the first-party
websites create chains of trust of length 3 or below. However, there
is also a small minority that dramatically exceed this chain length:
we find that all website categories import ≈2% of their external
resources from level 3 and above. In the most extreme case, we see
rg.ru (news) with a chain containing 38 levels, consisting of mutual
calls between adriver.ru (ad provider) and admelon.ru (IT web-
site). Other notable examples include thecrimson.com.bg (Har-
vard’s student newspaper), argumenti.ru (news), mundomax.com
(IT news), lifestyle.bg (entertainment) have a maximum depen-
dency level of 15. We argue that these complex configurations make
it extremely difficult to reliably audit such websites, as a first-party
cannot be assured of which objects are later loaded.
Briefly, we also note that Figure 3a reveals subtle differences
between different categories of third-party domains. For example,
3We only include the most popular categories.
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Lev. Total Image JS Data Font/CSS Uncat.
1 9,212,245 34.4% 30.6% 16.0% 7.8% 11.3%
2 1,566,841 48.8% 16.7% 11.7% 3.3% 19.4%
3 405,390 45.0% 12.3% 11.1% 1.3% 30.2%
4 78,107 41.8% 18.4% 8.0% 8.1% 23.6%
5 14,413 40.6% 18.0% 12.8% 2.0% 26.4%
≥6 10,208 36.6% 12.3% 13.0% 1.2% 36.8%
Table 2: Breakdown of resource types requested by the Top-200K
websites across each level in the dependency chain. Total column
refers to the number of resource calls made at each level.
those classified as adverts are most likely to be loaded at level 1; this
is perhaps to be expected, as many ad brokers naturally serve and
manage their own content. In contrast, Social Network third-parties
(e.g., Facebook plug-ins) are least likely to be loaded at level 1.
3.2 What objects exist in the chain?
The previous section has confirmed that a notable fraction of web-
sites create dependency chains with (up to) tens of levels. We
next inspect the types of resources imported within these depen-
dency chains. We classify resources into four main types: Image,
JavaScript, Data (consisting of HTML, JSON, XML, plain text files),
and CSS/Fonts. Table 2 presents the volume of each resource type
imported at each level in the trust chain. We observe that the make-
up of resources varies dramatically based on the level in the de-
pendency chain. For example, the fraction of images imported tend
to increase — this is largely because third-parties are in-turn load-
ing images (e.g., for adverts). In contrast, the fraction of JavaScript
programs decreases as the level in the dependency chain increases:
30.6% of resources at level 1 are JavaScript compared to just 12.3% at
level 3. This trend is caused by the fact that new levels are typically
created by JavaScript execution (thus, by definition, the fraction of
JavaScript must deplete along the chain). However, it remains at a
level that should be of concern to web engineers as this confirms
a significant fraction of JavaScript code is loaded from potentially
unknown implicitly trusted domains.
To build on this, we also inspect the categories of third-party
domains hosting these resources. Figure 3b presents the make-up
of third-party categories at each level in the chain. It is clear that,
across all levels, advertisement domains make up the bulk of third-
parties. We also notice other highly demanded third-party cate-
gories such as search engines, Business and IT. These are led by well
known providers, e.g., google-analytics.com (web-analytics4) is
on 68.3% of pages. The figure also reveals that the distributions of
categories vary across each dependency level. For example, 23.1%
of all loaded resources at level 1 come from advertisement domains,
37.3% at level 2, 46.2% at level 3, i.e., the proportion increases across
dependency levels. In contrast, social network third-parties (e.g.,
Facebook) are mostly presented at level 1 (9.58%) and 2 (13.57%)
with a significant drop at level 3. The dominance of advertisements
is not, however, caused by a plethora of ad domains: there are far
fewer ad domains than business or IT (see Table 3). Instead, it is
driven by the large number of requests to advertisements: Even
though ad domains only make-up 1.5% of third-parties, they gener-
ate 25% of resources. Naturally, these are led by major providers.
4Grouped as in business category as per VirusTotal reports.
Importantly, these popular providers can trigger further dependen-
cies; for example, doubleclick.com imports 16% of its resources
from further implicitly trusted third-party websites. This makes
such domains an ideal propagator of malicious resources for any
other domains having implicit trust in it.
4 FINDING SUSPICIOUS CHAINS
The previous section has shown that the creation of dependency
chains is widespread, and there is therefore extensive implicit trust
within the web ecosystem. This, however, does not shed light on
the activity of resources within the dependency chains, nor does it
mean that the implicit trust is abused by third-parties. Thus, we next
study the existence of suspicious third-parties, which could lead
to abuse of the implicit trust. Within this section we use the term
suspicious (to be more generic than malicious) because VirusTotal
covers activities ranging from low-risk (e.g., sharing private data
over unencrypted channels) to high-risk (malware).
4.1 Do chains contain suspicious parties?
First, we inspect the fraction of third-party domains that trigger a
warning by VirusTotal. From our third-party domains, 2.5% have a
VTscore of 1 or above, i.e., at least one virus checker classifies the
domain as suspicious. If one treats the VTscore as a ground truth,
this confirms that popular websites do load content from suspicious
third-parties via their chains of trust. However, we are reticent
to rely on VTscore ≥ 1, as this indicates the remaining 67 virus
checkers did not flag the domain5. Thus, we start by inspecting the
presence of suspicious third-parties using a range of thresholds.
Table 3 shows the fraction of third-parties that are classified
as suspicious using several VTscore thresholds. For context, we
separate third-parties into their respective categories (using Web-
Sense). The table confirms that a noticeable subset of suspicious
third-party domains exist; for example, if we classify any resource
with a VTscore ≥ 10 as suspicious, we find that 1.2% of third-party
domains are classified as suspicious with 6.2% of all resource calls
in our dataset going to these third-parties. Notably this only drops
marginally (to 5.7%) with a very conservative VTscore of ≥ 40. We
observe similar results when considering thresholds in the [3..50]
range. This confirms, with a high certainty, that approximately 6%
of resource calls in the dependency chains are towards domains
that engage in suspicious activity (see Section 5) for further details).
We will conservatively refer to domains with a VTscore ≥ 10 as
suspicious in the rest of this analysis.
Additionally, we inspect first-party domains that inherit suspi-
cious JavaScript resources from the explicit and various implicit
levels. We focus on JavaScript as active web content that poses great
threats with significant attack surfaces consisting of vulnerabilities
related to client-side JavaScript, such as cross-site scripting (XSS)
and advanced phishing [31]. Table 4 shows top first-party domains,
ranked according to the number of unique suspicious third-parties
in their chain of dependency. We note that the top ranked (most
vulnerable) first-party domains belong to various categories such
as Content Sharing, News, or IT. This indicates that there is no one
category of domains that inherits suspicious JavaScript. However,
we note that first party websites categorized as “Business” represent
5Diversity is likely caused by the virus databases used by the different virus checkers [5]
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VTScore ≥ 3 VTScore ≥ 10 VTScore ≥ 20 VTScore ≥ 40 VTScore ≥ 55
Category Third-Parties Total Calls Suspicious JS Num. Vol. Num. Vol. Num. Vol. Num. Vol. Num. Vol.
All 68,828 11,287,204 270,758 (2.4%) 1.6% 6.4% 1.2% 6.2% 1.0% 6.1% 0.6% 5.7% ≤ 0.1% ≤ 0.1%
Business 6,786 1,924,591 184,360 (9.6%) 1.5% 21.5% 1.1% 21.5% 1.0% 21.4% 0.5% 20.6% 0% 0%
Ads 1,017 2,870,482 7,924 (0.3%) 3.5% 0.1% 3.3% 0.1% 2.9% 0.1% 1.6% ≤ 0.1% 0% 0%
IT 8,619 1,646,287 10,547 (0.6%) 2.2% 3.8% 1.5% 3.6% 1.2% 3.5% 0.6% 3.0% ≤ 0.1% ≤ 0.1%
Other 52,406 4,845,844 67,927 (1.4%) 1.4% 4.6% 1.1 4.3% 0.9% 4.2% 0.6% 3.8% ≤ 0.1% ≤ 0.1%
Table 3: Overview of suspicious third-parties in each category. Col.2-4: number of third-party websites in different categories, the number of
resource calls to resources, and the proportion of calls to suspicious JavaScript. Col.5-9: Fraction of third-party domains classified as suspicious
(Num.), and fraction of resource calls classified as suspicious (Vol.), across various VTscores (i.e., ≥ 3 and ≥ 55).
the majority of most exposed domains at Level ≥2, with 16% of the
total number of first-party domains implicitly trusting suspicious
JavaScript belonging to the Business Category, with distant second
being the “News & Media” Category and third the “Adult” cate-
gory. The number of suspicious JavaScript codes loaded by these
first-party domains ranges from 4 to 31 programs. We note the
extreme case of amateur-fc2.com website implicitly importing 31
unique suspicious JavaScript programs from 4 unique suspicious
domains. Moreover, we observe at most 7 unique third-parties (com-
bining both explicit and implicit level) that is a cause of suspicious
JavaScripts in first-parties. This happens for privet-rostov.ru do-
main, having third-party domains such as charter.com, vk.com.
rambler.ru, doubleclick.net, dx.com, cdn.adlegend.com,
syncsw.pool.datamind.ru.
Unique Suspicious Domains at Level = 1
Alexa # Mal. Unique Chain
# First-party Domain Rank JSes Susp. Doms. Category Len.
1 theinscribermag.com 46,242 6 5 Blogs 5
2 skynet-system.com.ua 192,549 6 5 Busin. 4
3 nodwick.com 194,823 13 4 Enter. 4
4 iphones.ru 12,045 4 4 IT 4
5 privet-rostov.ru 193,024 6 4 LifeStyle 4
Unique Suspicious Domains at Level ≥ 2
1 traffic2bitcoin.com 33,513 6 5 Games 7
2 radionetplus.ru 166,003 8 4 SW Download 6
3 studiofow.tumblr.com 85,483 11 4 Adult 4
4 amateur-fc2.com 52,556 31 4 Adult 5
5 fasttorrent.ru 24,250 9 4 File Sharing 7
Table 4: Top 5 most exposed first-party domains (with VTscore ≥
10) ranked by the number of unique suspicious domains.
4.2 How widespread are suspicious parties?
We next inspect how “popular” these suspicious third-parties are
at each position in the dependency chain, by inspecting how many
websites utilize them. Figure 4a displays the cumulative distribution
(CDF) of resource calls to third-parties made by each first-party
webpage in our dataset. Within the figure, we decompose the third-
party resources into various groups (including total vs. suspicious).
As mentioned earlier, we take a conservative approach and consider
a resource suspicious if it receives a VTscore ≥ 10. The figure
reveals that suspicious parties within the dependency chains are
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Figure 4: CDF of resources loaded per-website from various cate-
gories of third-parties.
commonplace: 24.8% of all first-party webpages contain at least
3 third-parties classified as suspicious in their dependency chain.
Remarkably, 73% of first-party websites load resources from third-
parties at least once. Hence, even though only 1.6% of third-party
domains are classified as suspicious, their reach covers nearly three
quarters of websites (indirectly via implicit trust).
This is a product of the power-law distribution of third-
party “popularity” across websites: The top 20% of third-party
domains cover 86% (9,650,582) of all resource calls. Closer in-
spection shows that it is driven by one prominent third-party:
google-analytics.com. At first, we thought that this was an error,
however, during the measurement period google-analytics.com
obtained a VTscore of 51, suggesting a high degree of certainty. This
was actually caused by google-analytics.com loading another
third-party, sf-helper.net, which is known to distribute adwares
and spywares. It is unclear why Google was performing this. We
therefore repeated these checks in October 2018, to confirm that this
activity has ceased, and sf-helper.net is no longer loaded. Hence
to understand the impact its new de-classification has, Figure 4b
shows the distribution of resource calls to third-party categories
when google-analytics.com is benign. This reduces the number
of first-party websites exposed to suspicious resources by 63%. This
highlights effectively the impact of high centrality third-parties
being permitted to load further resources: the infection of just one
can immediately effect a significant fraction of websites.
Next we inspect in, Table 5, the top 10 most frequently encoun-
tered suspicious third-party domains that are providing suspicious
JavaScript resources to first-parties (as opposed to the most exposed
first-party domains shown earlier in Table 4). We rank these sus-
picious third-party domains according to their prevalence in the
Web ecosystem and further decompose our analysis at explicit and
implicit levels in the table.
As already discussed, we found google-analytics.com among
the most called domains. Interestingly, we find several suspicious
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Prevalence of Third-parties at Level = 1
# Third-party Domain Alexa Rank # FP Category
1 google-analytics.com 13,200 43,156 Business (Web Analytics)
2 gravater.com 2,292 3,520 IT
3 charter.com 12,714 3,425 Business
4 vk.com 13 2,815 Social Network
5 statcounter.com 2,265 2,327 Business (Web Analytics)
Prevalence of Third-parties at Level ≥ 2
1 charter.com 12,714 3,452 Business
2 vk.com 13 2,290 Social Network
3 livechatinc.com 888 851 Web Chat
4 onesignal.com 950 467 Business
5 rambler.ru 291 370 SearchEngine
Table 5: Top 5 most prevalent suspicious third-party domains
(with VTscore ≥ 10) on level 1 (explicit trust) and beyond (implicit
trust) providing resources to first-parties. #FP refers to the number
of First-party domains having the corresponding suspicious third-
party domain in their chain of dependency.
third-party domains from the Top 100 Alexa ranking. For-instance,
vk.com, a social network website mostly geared toward East-
European countries has been used by 3,094 first-parties and is
ranked 13 by Alexa. This website is found to be one of the most
prevalent suspicious third-party domains at both level 1 and levels
≥ 2. An obvious reason for this domain’s presence is because of
other infected (malware-based) apps that try to authenticate users
from such domains [35]. Other websites such as statcounter.com
or gravater.com are also among the most prevalent third party
domains in level 1. These websites were reported to contain mal-
ware in their Javascript codes [8]. For instance, users in statcounter
forums reported it as malicious because a Javascript running its
website redirects users to a malware website gocloudly.com, and
forces users to click the button [10].
While it is not shown in the tables, we also note the presence
of qq.com, a Chinese Search Engine ranked high by Alexa. This
is among the top 10 most encountered suspicious third-party do-
mains, as defined by several AntiVirus tools within VirusTotal.
Closer inspection reveals this is likely due to repeated instances of
insecure data transmission, use of qq fake accounts for malware
manifestation and for data encryption Trojans [13, 27, 44].
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Figure 5: Figure (a) depicts the number of suspicious JavaScript
content imported (explicitly and implicitly) by first-party domains
shown according to their Alexa ranking; and (b) shows the number
of impacted first-party domains as function of the ranking of do-
mains of Suspicious JavaScript.
More generally, we observe the presence of a wide range of
Alexa ranks in the list of most prevalent domains at levels ≥ 2. In
Figure 5a, we show the number of suspicious JavaScripts imported
by the first-party domains (Y-axis) according to their Alexa rank
(X-axis). Overall, first-party domains import a larger number of
suspicious third-party JavaScript codes at levels ≥ 2, however, the
first-party domains seem to be equally vulnerable to the implicit
import of suspicious content regardless of their rank. There are
exceptions though, signified by the peaks in the number of suspi-
cious JavaScripts — these are near exclusively driven by a large
number of ≥level-2 scripts (implicit trust). We also encountere an
interesting case, which we exclude from the graphs for readabil-
ity purposes: The first-party domain kikar.co.il imports 2,592
JavaScript codes originating from the third-party hwcdn.net, a
well-known browser hijacker that has been reported to force users
to visit spam pages [43]. The VirusTotal API indicates a VTscore of
22 for this suspicious domain. We also note that 35 other first-party
domains have this domain in their chain of dependency. Again, this
highlights the risk of implicit trust.
In Figure 5bwe show the number of impacted first-party domains
as a function of the Alexa Rank of suspicious third-party domains
(limited to a maximum Alexa Rank of 1 million) — note the log scale
of x axis. We observe that some very prevalent third-parties have a
highAlexa ranking (even excluding google-analytics.comwhich
as per our previous observation has the highest prevalence of 43,156
impacted first-party domains and hence excluded from Figure 5b for
readability purposes). Note a spike around 2000 rank, which reaches
a prevalence of 3500 first-party domains at level 1. This spike is
caused by gravatar.com, propagating suspicious Javascripts. This
supports our statements earlier (from Table 5) where gravatar.com
is ranked second top most suspicious domain. Similarly, a spike
around 10K rank indicates the presence of charter.com both at
level 1 and 2 respectively. These findings demonstrate the wide
variety of third-party suspicious JavaScript content loaded from
various, not necessarily “obscure”, third-party domains.
4.3 Which websites are impacted?
Next, we inspect the location(s) in the dependency chain where
these suspicious third-parties are situated, as well as the types of
websites that load them. This is vital, as implicitly trusted (≥level
2) resources are far more difficult for a first-party administrator to
remove — they could, of course, remove the intermediate level 1
resource, but this may disrupt their own business activities. Table 6
presents the proportion of websites that import at least one re-
source with a VTscore ≥ 10. We separate resources into their level
in the dependency chain. Interestingly, the majority of resources
classified as suspicious are located at level 1 in the dependency
chain (i.e., they are explicitly trusted by the first-party). 73% of
websites containing suspicious third-parties are “infected” via level
1. This suggests that these website operators are not entirely dili-
gent in monitoring their third-party resources. This might include
websites that purposefully utilize such third-parties [17]. Perhaps
more important, the above leaves a significant minority of sus-
picious resources imported via implicit trust (i.e., level ≥ 2). In
these cases, the first-party is potentially unaware of their pres-
ence. The most vulnerable category is news: over 15% of news sites
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Figure 6: Distribution of calls to suspicious third-party websites per category at each level, for all top-200K websites (Figure 6a) and most
vulnerable first-party categories (Figures 6b, 6c).
import implicitly trusted resources from level 2 with a VTscore
≥ 10. Notably, among the 56 news websites importing suspicious
JavaScript resources from trust level 3 and deeper, we find 52 load-
ing advertisements from adadvisor.net. One possible reason is
that ad-networks could be infected or victimized with malware to
perform malvertising [32, 42].
All News Sports Entertainment Forums
Lv. All JS All JS All JS All JS All JS
1 61.30% 57.70% 75.40% 73.50% 75.70% 73.20% 69.30% 65.60% 67.40% 65.50%
2 5.20% 2.20% 13.40% 5.60% 11.10% 3.70% 8.60% 4.10% 9.10% 4.05%
3 1.30% 0.18% 2.90% 0.45% 3.60% 0.28% 2.70% 0.30% 3.20% 0.15%
4 0.22% ≤ 0.1% 0.64% 0.08% 0.80% ≤ 0.1% 0.70% 0.08% 0.60% 0.00%
≥ 5 ≤ 0.1% 0 0.002 ≤ 0.1% 0.001% ≤ 0.1% 0.002% ≤ 0.1% ≤0.001% 0.00%
Table 6: Proportion of top-200K websites importing resources clas-
sified as suspicious (with VTscore ≥ 10) at each level.
Similar, albeit less extreme, observations can be made across
Sports, Entertainment, and Forum websites. Briefly, Figure 6 also
displays the categories of (suspicious) third-parties loaded at each
level in the dependency chain — it can be seen that the majority
are classified as business. This is, again, because of several ma-
jor providers classified as suspicious such as convexity.net and
charter.com. Furthermore, it can be seen that the fraction of ad-
vertisement resources also increases with the number of levels due
to the loading of further resources (e.g., images).
Next, we again focus on JavaScript content as, when loaded,
it can represent significant security risks: Our analysis is moti-
vated by well known attack vectors underpinned by JavaScript,
e.g., malvertising [32], malware injection and exploit kits redirec-
tion. These are exemplifed by the recent reporting that Equifax
and TransUnion were hit by a third-party web analytics script
[30, 38]. Figure 7 presents the breakdown of the domain categories
hosting the JavaScript resources we observe. Clear trends can be
seen, with IT (e.g., dynaquestpc.com), Business (e.g.,vindale.com),
News and Media (e.g., therealnews.com), and Entertainment
(e.g.,youwatchfilm.net) dominating.
Clearly, suspicious JavaScript resources cover a broad spectrum
of activities. Interestingly, we observed that 70% and 67%, respec-
tively, of Business (Web analytics) and Ads JavaScripts are loaded
from level ≥ 2 in contrast to 17% and 31% of JavaScripts of Govern-
ment and Shopping loaded at level 1. We next strive to quantify the
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Figure 8: CDF of suspicious JavaScripts (VTscores ≥ 10) at different
levels in the chain.
level of suspicion raised by each of these JavaScripts. Intuitively,
those with higher VTscores represent a higher threat as defined by
the 68 AV tools used by VirusTotal. Hence, Figure 8 presents the
cumulative distribution of the VTscores for all JavaScript resources
loaded with VTscore > 0. We separate the JavaScripts into their
location in the dependency chain. Clear difference can be observed,
with level 2 obtaining the highest VTscore (median 28). In fact, 78%
of the suspicious JavaScript resources loaded on trust level 2 have
a VTscore > 52 (indicating very high confidence).
This is a critical observation since as mentioned earlier, while
suspicious third-parties at level 1 can be ultimately removed by
first-party website operators if flagged as suspicious, this is much
more difficult for implicitly trusted resources further along the
dependency chain. If the intermediate (non-suspicious) level 1 re-
source is vital for the webpage, it is likely that some operators
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would be unable or unwilling to perform this action. The lack of
transparency and the inability to perform a vetting process on im-
plicitly trusted loaded resources further complicates the issue. It
is also worth noting that the VTscore for resources loaded further
down the dependency chain is lower (e.g., level 4). For example, 80%
of level 4 resources receive a VTscore below 5. This suggests that
the activity of these resources is more contentious, with a smaller
number of AV tools reaching consensus. It is impossible to state the
reason for this, hence in Section 5 we analyze the dynamic activities
of these JavaScript content.
5 ANALYSIS OF SUSPICIOUS JAVASCRIPT
RESOURCES
JavaScript is arguably the riskiest resource to import as this has the
potential to execute diverse functions (including the downloading
of further resources). Thus, we next inspect the activities of the
7,166 JavaScript scripts that were classified as suspicious.
5.1 Methodology
We use a dedicated testbed, depicted in Figure 9, composed of three
Virtual machines (VMs) that connect to the Internet via a com-
puter that runs Cuckoo sandbox and tcpdump, respectively, to log
all system-level events and to intercept all the traffic being trans-
mitted between the virtual machines and the Internet. These VMs
monitor already detected publishers using different browser user-
agent configurations (IE 11 and Firefox 63.0.1) and cookie clearing
strategies (“always clear cookies”). This allows us to observe the
traffic generated by each JavaScript code when it is rendered by the
VMs’ browsers. For instance, Cuckoo sandbox keeps track of net-
work traffic generated; all types of file operations, memory changes,
registry changes when the JavaScript code was loaded.
JS
Report 
Generator 
and Analyzer
Executing 
Malware 
Samples on 
VMs
Host Machine
Internet
Figure 9: Overview of our testbed with a host machine running
Cuckoo sandbox (v2.0.6).
For each test, first we create an HTML code and inject suspicious
JavaScript code in < script > tag and then load the HTML code in
the browser of one of our VMs. Each test lasts 123.01±2.53 seconds.
Prior to each test, we also ensure that the previous JavaScript code
we experimented with is removed from the browser history as well
as browser and VM’s cache (e.g., DNS cache) and we reboot the de-
vice to enforce the complete renewal of the VM. This analysis draws
boundary for the suspicious behavior of JavaScript code during sus-
picious redirects and local file changes. We share the code and data
for the testbed is at https://wot19submission.github.io.
5.2 Results
Our sandbox provides vantage onto the network activity generated
by JavaScript resources, alongside any dropfile they generate. We
next analyze the JavaScript along these two axes.
5.2.1 Summary of Suspicious JavaScripts. We begin by providing a
brief overview of the most prominent JavaScript resources observed
in our dataset. 44.7% exist at level 1 (explicit trust) and 55.3% at level
≥ 2 (implicit trust). Table 7 provides a list of the JavaScript resources
that generate the most HTTP requests. We separate them into im-
plicit and explicitly trusted resources. The most typical purpose of
these JavaScripts are downloading dropper files. Whereas those at
level 1 tend to have lower VTscores, whereas VT classifies those at
level ≥ 2 with a higher confidence. The most regularly observed
JavaScript at level 1 is new-play-1.js, a relatively highly ranked
(22,574 Alexa) script which downloads dropfiles–executables such
as Exploitkits, Trojans, Fake AV or mediaplayers performing sus-
picious activities. In contrast, at level ≥ 2, it is blog.js, which
show annoying ads and involve in click fraud. Overall, we see that
99.5% of JavaScript resources download dropfiles with 98.62% of it
involved in malvertising and click frauds.
5.2.2 Analyzing Network Activity . We observe significant network
activity generated by the suspicious JavaScript resources within
our testbed. Figure 10 presents the CDFs of the number of HTTP
requests generated per suspicious JavaScript code. The figure splits
the JavaScript into their respective positions in the dependency
chains, and their categories (categories of third-party domains in
which they originate from). Although 47% of JavaScript resources
generate fewer than 5 requests, there are notable differences among
the different levels. JavaScript resources at level 1 generate the
fewest HTTP requests (median 2), yet level ≥ 4 are extremely active
(median 30). 36% of the JavaScripts imported from level 5 generate at
least 30 HTTP requests in contrast to 15% of the JavaScripts sourced
from level 2. This is in contrast to a typical behavior of legitimate
JavaScripts that have been previously measured to generate on
average 4 HTTP requests[37]. In essence, we observed that the
further down the dependency chain, the more active the suspicious
JavaScript. This is worrying as resources loaded further down the
dependency chain are the most opaque to the website operator.
Figure 10b and 10c also separate the JavaScript resources into
their respective categories. Whereas those at level 1 (explicit trust)
exhibit relatively similar traits across all categories, we find that
those at level ≥ 2 (implicit trust) have far more divergence. Those
classified as Business, IT or Adult are the most active, whereas
News, Ads and Download generate the fewest. This is driven by the
fact that most Business (i.e., subcategory web-analytics) domains
are continuously tracking dynamic content for a number of domains
rather than, for example, JavaScripts codes from IT (i.e., subcategory
hosting providers), Adult, and Blogs domains, which source static
resources for various domains [19]. For instance, JavaScripts from
Business category at level 1 generate on average 3 HTTP requests
vs. 19 for those at level ≥ 2.
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# Level JavaScript Category VTscore A-Rank HTTP Domains Observed Behavior
1 Lvl-1 http://pinshan.com/js/union/new-play-1.js Business 12 25,574 12 5 PUP activity, Installing Fake AV and mediaplayers
2 Lvl-1 http://newyx.net/js/dui_lian.js Games 11 22,057 12 6 Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
3 Lvl-1 http://loxblog.com/fs/clocks/02.js IT 10 86,505 10 3 Installing additional SW with elevated privileges
4 Lvl-1 http://mecum.com/js/jquery.fancybox.pack.js Business 13 51,897 9 3 PUP activity, Installing Fake AV and mediaplayers
5 Lvl-1 http://bubulai.com/js/xp.js Enter. 10 117,261 9 5 Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
1 Lvl≥2 http://yourjavascript.com/3439241227/blog.js PNandBackup 13 2,007,688 58 51 Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
2 Lvl≥2 http://negimemo.net/alichina/login.js SW Download 10 13,093,855 49 21 Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
3 Lvl≥2 http://funday24.ru/js/c/funday-index.js News 11 2,017,900 42 9 Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
4 Lvl≥2 http://netcheckcdn.xyz/optout/set/strtm.js Business 14 18,064,762 42 7 Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
5 Lvl≥2 http://pushmoneyapp.com/js/main.js Business 17 8,757,970 41 6 Installing additional SW with elevated privileges
Table 7: Top 5 suspicious JSes, with at least 41 HTTP requests, found in the dependency chain (level 1 and levels≥2) of 200K domains.
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Figure 10: CDFs of number of HTTP requests generated per suspicious JS viewed across categories of domains and dependency levels.
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Figure 11: Heatmap of number of requests to domains by suspi-
cious JavaScript codes and histogram of top 25 contacted domains
by suspicious JavaScripts.
A very important consideration here is to understand what are
the domains that are targeted by these HTTP requests. For ease of
presentation, we consider the top 25 domains targeted by the Suspi-
cious JavaScript codes (in terms of total number of HTTP requests
targeting them). Figure 11 presents a heatmap illustrating the num-
ber of requests to the top 25 domains by the suspicious JavaScript
codes, with the the X-axis showing the suspicious JavaScript, the
Y-axis listing the targeted domains and the heat defined by the
fraction of requests that each JavaScript issued to each domain. We
immediately see that most JavaScripts have a distinct preference
towards a small set of domains. 18% of JavaScripts submit over
50% of their HTTP requests to a single domain. One particularly
popular domain is bing.com; 65% of all JavaScripts access this do-
main at least once. A closer inspection of these JavaScript suggests
that most of the ones targeting bing.com undertake some form of
SEO poisoning (search poisoning) activities launching exploits to
trick and elevate the ranking of some particular URLs in the results
listings of the search engine [15, 23].
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Figure 12: Number of HTTP requests launched to each domain.
Figure 12 presents the count of HTTP requests across the top
25 targeted domains. We separate into JavaScripts at level 1 vs.
level ≥ 2. Again, the figure shows that most commonly occurring
HTTP fetch is to bing.com; In general, we observed that search
engines are heavily targeted by scripting codes (to elevate certain
URLs and websites as observed in previous research [23]). Similar
organizations are seenwithin this top ranking, e.g., microsoft.com,
google.com. We stress the importance of this observation as we
recall that the JavaScript code is loaded on the first-party domain
(either explicitly or implicitly). Hence the first-party domains might
be involved in stealthy suspicious activities triggered by third-party
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domains the former are not even aware of. This observation is
even more enlightened by our earlier observation that suspicious
JavaScript are more active when at level ≥ 2 which is confirmed in
Figure 12. We note the existence of various certification authorities
and observed various JavaScript codes requesting encryption (SSL)
methods and HTTPS requests that we did not investigate further.
We leave this as future work.
5.2.3 Analyzing Dropfiles. The above has revealed that a large
number of suspicious JavaScript resources download files. The use
of “droppers” is commonplace, and they are often used during
the infection process [3]. For instance, these files can potentially
contain the unpacked malware binary that could potentially present
worrisome vulnerabilities. Hence, we next inspect the creation of
local files by JavaScript.
We find that 99.5% of the analyzed JavaScript resources generate
dropfiles, indicating that this is one of the most common used beav-
ior of suspicious JavaScripts. Figure 13 depicts the distribution of
the number of files dropped by the JavaScript content. We observe
a significant number of active memory operations as depicted by
the number of dropped files: remarkably, 22% of JavaScript gener-
ate at least 8 files from memory. Table 8 presents the top-10 most
active, ranked according to the number of dropfiles, suspicious
JavaScript. Some of these JavaScript resources are extremely ac-
tive. For example, xbigg.com/adv.js, which is loaded at level 1,
downloads 16 files. More worryingly, the propensity to download
drop files actually increases further along the chain: the most active
JavaScript, http://yourjavascript.com/3439241227/blog.js at level
4 downloads 129 files. It is also interesting to observe that the re-
sources at level ≥ 2 also tend to have higher VTscores, indicating
that their activities are blocked by a large number of virus checkers.
The actual content of the files are quite diverse. 8% are encrypted,
and therefore cannot be examined. The remainder are Potentially
Unwanted Programs (0.52%), Exploitkits (0.36%), Adware and Click
Bots (98.62%), and Trojan (0.50%) according to VirusTotal reports.
For instance, we observe that videowood.tv/assets/js/poph.js uses
eval()–JavaScript’s dynamic loading method–to download and
executes via 1832-fc204a9bcefeab3d.exe (with VTscore=5)– to
take over web browser for displaying a wide range of annoying ads
and to garner fraudulent clicks.
6 RELATEDWORK
There has been a wealth of research into the utilisation and exploita-
tion of third-parties [19] [33] [31] [18] [40] [39]. Falahrastegar et
al. [9] inspected the use of third-parties across top Alexa websites,
exploring how third-party operators differ based on region. Niki-
forakis et al. [33] demonstrated in 2012 that large proportions of
websites rely on JavaScript libraries hosted on ill-maintained ex-
ternal web servers, making JavaScript exploits trivial. Lauinger et
al. [31] led a further study, classifying sensitive libraries and the
vulnerabilities caused by them. Gomer et al. [11] analysed users’
exposure to tracking in the context of search, showing that 99.5%
of users are tracked by popular trackers within 30 clicks. Further,
Hozinger et al. [14] found 61 JavaScript exploits and empirically
defined three main attack vectors.
Our work differs quite substantially from these in that we are
not interested in the JavaScript code itself, nor the simple presence
of third-party domains in a webpage. Instead, we are interested in
how third-parties are loaded, and their use of “implicit” trust (i.e.,
dependency chains). In contrast to our work, these prior studies
ignore the presence of dependency chains and treat all third-parties
as “equal”, regardless of where they are loaded in the dependency
chain. Closer to our own work is Bashir et al. [2], who studied web-
sites’ resource inclusion trees and analyzed retargeted ads using
crowdsourcing. This allowed them to identify and classify ad do-
mains, as well as predominant cookie matching partners in the ad
exchange environment. Our study is far broader, and sheds light on
dependency chains across many different types of websites rather
than simply inspecting advertisements. More related is Kumar et
al. [28], who recently characterized websites’ resource dependen-
cies on third-party services. In-line with our work, they found that
dependency chains are widespread. This means, for example, that
55% of websites are prevented from fully migrating to HTTPS by
their dependencies. Their focus was not, however, on identifying
suspicious or malicious activities. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first study to analyze the role of implicit trust from
a security perspective to better understand the role of dependency
chains in loading suspicious third-party content.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has explored dependency chains in the web ecosystem.
Inspired by the lack of prior work focusing on how resources are
loaded, we found that over 40% of websites do rely on implicit
trust. Although the majority (84.91%) of websites have short chains
(with levels of dependencies below 3), we found first-party web-
sites with chains exceeding 30 levels. Of course, the most com-
monly implicitly trusted third-parties are well known operators
(e.g., doubleclick.net), but we also observed various less known
implicit third-parties. We hypothesised that this might create no-
table attack surfaces. To confirm this, we classified the third-parties
using VirusTotal to find that 1.2% of third-parties are classified
as potentially malicious. Worryingly, our confidence in the clas-
sification actually increases for implicitly trusted resources (i.e.,
trust level2), where 78% of JavaScripts have a VTscore > 52. These
resources have remarkable reach — largely driven by the pres-
ence of highly central third-parties, e.g., google-analytics.com.
With this in mind, we performed sandboxes experiments on the
suspicious JavaScript to understand their actions. We witnessed
extensive download activities, much of which consisted of dropper
files and malware, which was being installed on the machine. It
was particularly worrying to see that JavaScript resources loaded at
level ≥ 2 in the dependency chain tended to have more aggressive
properties, particularly as exhibited by their higher VTscore. This
exposes the need to tighten the loose control over indirect resource
loading and implicit trust: it creates exposure to risks such as mal-
ware distribution, SEO poisoning, malvertising and exploit kits
redirection. We argue that ameliorating this can only be achieved
through transparency mechanisms that allow web developers to
better understand the resources on their webpages (and the related
risks).
This is only the first step in our research agenda. Most notably,
we wish to perform longitudinal measurements to understand how
these metrics of maliciousness evolve over time. We are particularly
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Figure 13: CDF of dropfiles downloaded and operated (i.e., read/write operation) by suspicious JavaScript codes.
# Level JavaScript Code # of Drop files % of Mal. DropFiles VTscore Mal. Type Observed Behavior
1 Lvl-1 http://xbigg.com/adv.js 16 64% 9 AdCB Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
2 Lvl-1 https://passback.free.fr/webmails/js/edito.js 10 82% 4 AdCB Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
3 Lvl-1 http://via-midgard.info/engine/ajax/loginza.js 10 89% 5 AdCB Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
4 Lvl-1 http://pokesnipe.de/js/app.min.js 10 90% 4 Torjan Installing additional SW with elevated privileges
5 Lvl-1 http://hdvideo18.com/includes/ace.min.js 8 100% 3 AdCB Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
1 Lvl≥2 http://yourjavascript.com/3439241227/blog.js 129 20% 15 AdCB Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
2 Lvl≥2 http://s2d6.com/js/globalpixel.js 25 69% 11 AdCB Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
3 Lvl≥2 http://cmsdude.org/wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.js 12 71% 11 AdCB Displaying annoying ads and perform click fraud
4 Lvl≥2 http://widih.com/js/like.js 10 90% 10 PUP PUP activity, Installing Fake AV and mediaplayers
5 Lvl≥2 http://pichak.net/blogcod/clock/04/clock.js 8 100% 10 Exploitkit Installing Exploitkit and performing Web redirects
Table 8: Top 5 suspicious JavaScript codes with dropped files at explicit and implicit dependency level. AdCB means Adware and Click Bots.
interested in understanding the (potentially) ephemeral nature of
threats. Without this, we are reticent to draw long-term conclusions.
Another line of work is understanding how level ≥ 1 JavaScript
content creates inter-dependencies between websites. This is par-
ticularly noteworthy among hypergiants (e.g., Google), who are
present on a large number of first-party websites. We intend to per-
form graph analysis to understand how removing these hypergiants
may impact the presence of interconnected suspicious third-parties.
Finally, by opening our collected datasets and experiments code
and scripts to the wider research community, we hope this paper
has shed some light on an important security consideration of to-
day’s Web and we call for further collaboration and research to
help address this.
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